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Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette*
When has a researcher done enough to merit a patent? Should the patent
belong to the researcher who first suggests an invention or the one who brings
it to fruition? The canonical dispute over a fox in Pierson v. Post is used to
illustrate the competing policy considerations in deciding when to award a new
property right, including providing efficient incentives, setting forth clear rules
to guide future behavior, and respecting natural rights. In patent law, all of
these considerations uggest that in practice, many patents are awarded too
early, before an applicant has demonstrated that the invention is likely to work.
The main problem seems to be not with the substantive standards but with the'
Patent Office's institutional competence to enforce these standards. A patent is
supposed to teach a researcher of "ordinary skill" in the field how to make the
invention without "undue experimentation." Yet it often takes extraordinary
skill to recognize when this standard is not met based merely on reading a
patent application-expertise that the typical patent examiner lacks. To address
this information asymmetry, it is worth experimenting with bringing those of
extraordinary skill into the patent examination process through a robust peer
review system. So far, opportunities for outside input such as the Peer To Patent.
pilot project have focused on providing examiners with additional prior art, but
peer review would be far more valuable for evaluating patent disclosures to
assess whether applicants have in fact done enough work to merit a patent or
whether it remains too early in the chase.
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INTRODUCTION
A researcher may patent her novel invention once she
"possesses" it.1 Yet the question of what constitutes possession has
bedeviled property theorists for centuries, as demonstrated by the
enduring resonance of the 1805 property case Pierson v. Post.2 Should
the fox belong to the hunter who begins the chase or the one who makes
the kill? Should an invention belong to the researcher who begins work
on it or the one who brings it to fruition? Patent law at times provides
some reward to both researchers-after all, ideas are more easily
divisible than foxes.3 But neither the majority nor the dissent in Pierson
v. Post thought the fox should be awarded to a casual observer who spots
the fox but who has little chance of completing the chase.4 And yet in
patent law, the current balance seems tipped too far toward such casual
early chasers, whether one's lodestar is efficiency or natural rights. As
numerous patent scholars have observed, too many patents seem to be
awarded too early to patentees who haven't done enough to show that
the invention works.
5
Part of the problem is the legal standard for patent disclosures.
To the surprise of many scientists, one can receive a patent without
doing experiments or building models to confirm that the invention
works as expected.6 But a patent must at least enable the "person
having ordinary skill in the art" to make and use the invention without
1. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
("[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably
conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter
as of the filing date."); see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 550-53 (2012) (summarizing the other disclosure requirements).
2. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). For readers with rusty memories of property law, the
majority concluded that the fox belonged to Pierson, who killed it, rather than Post, who began the
pursuit with his hounds. Id. The case has come to stand as a simple illustration of the maxim that
"possession is the root of title," Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 73, 75-77 (1985), though the historical context was more complicated than the court's
recitation of facts suggests, see Bethany R. Berger, It's Not About the Fox: The Untold History of
Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1090 (2006).
3. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29 (discussing the challenge of
rewarding both early- and late-stage innovators).
4. The dissent favored Post, the initial huntsman, over Pierson, the "saucy intruder, who
had not shared in the honours or labours of the chase." Pierson, 3 Cai. at 181 (Livingston, J.,
dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016); Sean Seymore,
The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010).
6. See Ouellette, supra note 1, at 553. This rule is "well settled." Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
525 U.S. 55, 61 (1998).
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"undue experimentation,"7 which would seem sufficient to weed out
many armchair inventors. To better align the patent reward with the
inventor's contribution, examiners and courts should do more to enforce
this requirement-to make patentees show their work.
Patent disclosures serve two functions, which Professor Dan
Burk refers to as the teaching function and the limitation function.8
First, they teach others about the invention-an underappreciated
benefit, though incidental to the primary incentive-based justification
for granting patents.9 Second, and more importantly, making patentees
show their work ensures that they actually did enough work to deserve
a patent. Of course, determining what constitutes enough is the hard
part, and patent rights cannot be limited to only the exact
configurations tested by the inventor.10 But patenting practices seem
divorced from the standards for judging technical contributions in many.
fields, with patents looking more like research proposals than
completed scientific papers.11
Both functions are important, but failures in the limitation
function likely lead to larger welfare losses. When an applicant presents
data showing that an invention works but obfuscates key steps of the
method, the public loses out on the teaching function that a clearer
protocol would have provided, but the patent is still probably going to
the right person.12 In contrast, when an applicant receives a patent on
an uncertain research plan, it not only means that the patent is not.
serving a useful teaching function-it also limits the patent incentive
7. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An invention is defined by a "claim"-a
one-sentence summary at the end of the patent that sets the legal limits of the patentee's right to
exclude. One patent often has many claims. The rest of the patent, variously called the
"specification," "written description," or "disclosure," must show that the patentee possessed the
claimed invention and must teach others how to make and use it. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
8. Dan Burk, Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603 (2016).
9. For defenses of the disclosure theory of patents (coupled with skepticism about how well
patents serve this function), see Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009);
and Seymore, supra note 5. I have argued that patent disclosures cannot justify the patent system
but that they are more useful to scientists than prior scholars have recognized and that the benefit
of improving disclosures likely outweighs the cost. Ouellette, supra note 1.
10. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 1097, 1114 (2011); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008).
11. Cf. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 601 (noting this problem and arguing for "[biringing
patents more in line with scientific norms").
12. Professor Sean Seymore might disagree. See Sean B. Seymore, Reinvention, NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2741038 [https://perma.cc/6MFS-SVXF]. But I
have argued that patent disclosures, while an important benefit, are not a compelling justification
for patents. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 554-61.
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for others to solve the problems necessary to obtain the completed
invention.13
The difficulty in weeding out such patents is that patent
examiners are ill equipped to determine when an application really is
just a research plan for which "undue experimentation" is still required.
Patent examiners rarely have much experience in the fields they
examine: fewer than four percent have a Ph.D.,14 and high attrition
rates mean that most examiners have been working at the U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office ("USPTO") for less than four years.15 And even
when examiners have ordinary skill in the art, this may not be enough.
Patents must enable the hypothetical person of ordinary skill to
recreate the invention, but it often takes extraordinary skill to recognize
when a disclosure is insufficient based merely on reading it.
In this Article, I argue that to address this problem, it is
necessary to bring insights from persons of extraordinary skill into the
USPTO. Part I describes how policing the problem of early patents
requires such expertise. I argue that all of the competing considerations
in deciding when to award a property right-familiar to first-year law
students from discussions of Pierson v. Post-point oward awarding
patents later than is often done in practice through more stringent
enforcement of the disclosure requirements. But such enforcement is
difficult without greater technical expertise.
Part II discusses the potential value of bringing outside
expertise into the patent examination process and explains why
mechanisms focused on identifying relevant prior art are likely
insufficient.1 6 The USPTO has experimented with a small-scale "Peer
To Patent" program to allow crowdsourcing of prior art,17 and third
parties are also allowed to submit relevant prior art through the
13. To be sure, others may still work on the project if they think the early patent can be
invalidated or if they think their improvement patent (their portion of the fox pelt) will have
sufficient value. For example, the University of Rochester's later-invalidated patents on cox-2
inhibitors did not deter pharmaceutical companies from developing and commercializing drugs in
this class. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 919 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But
unnecessary early patents still reduce the potential reward for follow-on innovators.
14. See Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience and
Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2163 fig.2 (2014).
15. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 820 (2012) (reporting that of the 2,797 examiners who
worked on patents filed in January 2001, thirty-five percent had one year or less of experience and
twenty-eight percent had two to four years of experience).
16. Prior art includes all information, including printed documents and actual uses, that is
considered "prior" to the application and that is therefore relevant to assessing whether the
claimed invention is novel and nonobvious. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012).
17. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
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preissuance submissions process.18 But these mechanisms do not allow
experts to discuss enablement problems. As I have argued previously,
peer review would be far more useful for evaluating disclosure than for
locating prior art.19
Finally, Part III discusses the feasibility of experimenting with
a more robust patent peer review system that allows experts to opine
on whether undue experimentation is still required to practice an
invention. Persons of extraordinary skill likely would be helpful not
only for identifying failures in the limitation function of patent
disclosures but also for spotting other problems with disclosures and
with other criteria for patentability.20 But the most compelling case for
attempting to bring this technical expertise into the patent examination
process is to make it easier to assess whether applicants have in fact
done enough work to merit a patent or whether it remains too early in
the chase.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PROPHETIC PATENT DISCLOSURES
To help make the problems with patent disclosures more
concrete, consider the tunable carbon nanotube resonator. (The
scientific details are unimportant for this story, but this device is like a
tiny guitar string that is hooked up to an electrical circuit that can
change the string's vibration frequency.)21 When I was in physics
graduate school at Cornell, one of my labmates, Vera Sazonova, created
the first tunable carbon nanotube resonator with some others in our lab,
and they published the result in Nature (one of the most prestigious
scientific journals) in 2004.22 They did not seek a patent. But others did,
including a Caltech group that filed an application claiming a tunable
nanotube resonator three years earlier, in 2001-after Sazonova had
begun work on her Ph.D. project.23 The Caltech patent shows no data
from a nanotube resonator, and its examples are described in the
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (2012); infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
19. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 591.
20. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2012).
21. For an overview, see H.B. Meerwaldt et al., Carbon Nanotubes: Nonlinear High-Q
Resonators with Strong Coupling to Single-Electron Tunneling, in FLUCTUATING NONLINEAR
OSCILLATORS: FROM NANOMECHANICS TO QUANTUM SUPERCONDUCTING CIRCUITS 312, 314-17
(Mark Dykman ed., 2012).
22. Vera Sazonova et al., A Tunable Carbon Nanotube Electromechanical Oscillator, 431
NATURE 284, 284 (2004); see also Vera A. Sazonova, A Tunable Carbon Nanotube Resonator (Aug.
2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University), http://ecommons.cornell.edu
bitstream/handle/18133205fPhDThesisSazonova.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TH3-T2W2].
23. See U.S. Patent No. 6,803,840 (filed Apr. 1, 2002) (claiming priority to provisional
applications filed on Mar. 30, 2001).
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present tense-an indication that they are what is known as "prophetic
examples" written to support a "constructive reduction to practice"
rather than actual results from a working device.24
For an earlier project on patent disclosures, I gave this Caltech
patent to Sazonova for review.25 She said it described devices "very
similar" to her own and would have been "a good place to start" for
understanding the problem and useful "to know that we were not alone
[in] thinking of building a [nanotube] resonator that way."26 But she
quickly concluded that the patent "is not giving any solutions to any
problems we have encountered along the way."27 In other words, it was
no different from what she or others in the field could have written
then-it did not solve the hard problems that had to be overcome for
the device to actually work, so it seemed more like a grant application
than a technical contribution. She was quite surprised to learn that one
can patent "something that CAN be envisioned, given all the
technologies of the day (kind of a Gedankenexperiment)" rather than
only "a particular invention that has been implemented and shown to
work."
28
This anecdote helps illustrate two related problems with the
patent system: (1) the lack of clarity on when one can patent a given
invention; and (2) the frequent award of patents earlier than is socially
optimal. The remainder of this Part discusses these problems in turn.
First, in the progression from a nascent research plan for
creating an invention to something that actually works, when can one
receive a patent?29 Researchers uch as Sazonova who are supposed to
24. See id. As noted above, a constructive reduction to practice is legally sufficient if the
patent enables one of skill in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. And prophetic examples are allowed,
though they must be drafted in the present tense; writing a prophetic example in the past tense
can lead to a patent being held unenforceable for inequitable conduct. See Novo Nordisk Pharm.,
Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
25. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 581.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 581 n.158:
In particular, she said that the patent proposes "to use charge injection to modulate the
length," but "that effect will be much smaller than the electrostatic attraction that
would be present anyway, something that [the patentees] didn't anticipate." The patent
also does not consider: (1) how to prevent "capacitive coupling between electrodes 18
and 28," (2) how to separate "tension induced with the charge injection" from "tension
due to the attractive force between the resonating member and the electrode 28," (3)
how "the RF signal [will] be read out of a high-impedance resonating member[ ] without
[an] integrated amplifier," or (4) "[w]hat kind of contact resistances are produced with
this fabrication method ... and how will they affect the charge injection."
28. Id. at 581.
29. This transition is of course not the only timing issue in patent law. An invention that
works in a research laboratory may be quite far from a commercial product, or its commercial
applications may be as-yet unknown.
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be one of the audiences for patent laws do not understand what the
rules are, in large part because the rules themselves are unclear. As a
formal matter, of course, the rules on the timing of patentability are
simple enough to state. Under the enablement and written description
requirements of § 112 of the Patent Act, you cannot get a patent if the
person of ordinary skill still must undertake "undue experimentation"
30
or if you cannot demonstrate "possession of the claimed subject matter
as of the filing date."3 1 These requirements are "closely related" to the
utility requirement of § 101, which prevents the patenting of "mere
ideas" or "a mere research proposal."32 Relatedly, the patentable-
subject-matter requirement of § 101 prevents patents on an "abstract
idea" rather than a more specific "application."
33
But trying to apply these doctrines to a specific question-such
as when a tunable carbon nanotube resonator may be patented-is
challenging. Professor Dmitry Karshtedt has called application of the
various patent timing doctrines "tentative and unsystematic" and has
argued for a more unified statutory "completeness" requirement.34 In a
number of cases, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held
research plans and proposals to be sufficiently enabled to be patentable
on their own or to anticipate a patent on later results.35 Yet there are
many other cases that have disallowed such claims.
36
Determining whether a disclosure requires an "undue" level of
experimentation "is not a single, simple factual determination but
30. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
31. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). For
an empirical study of how these requirements have been adjudicated in cases involving different
technologies from 1982-2012, see John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts
Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609 (2016).
32. Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (In re '318 Patent Infringement
Litig.), 583 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A patentee must identify some "specific and
substantial utility" for a claimed invention. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For
a discussion of how utility doctrine could act as a stronger timing policy lever, see Michael Risch,
Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1211-16.
33. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
34. Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949,
991-92 (2015). Professor Karshtedt was focused primarily, however, on the transition from
foundational building-block inventions to specific downstream applications, rather than on the
transition from research plan to working examples. Cf. supra note 29 (noting this distinction).
35. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re
Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435
F. App'x 917, 923-26 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
36. See, e.g., AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. v. Associated Reg'l & Univ. Pathologists, Inc., 642 F.3d 1031,
1037 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual
considerations," including the eight Wands factors-such as "the
quantity of experimentation necessary" and "the nature of the
invention"-though even these are merely "illustrative, not
mandatory."37 The leading patent treatise, Chisum on Patents, does not
attempt to provide any guidelines for applying these factors; it merely
notes that cases "finding that the amount of experimentation required
by a given specification was reasonable or not undue ... are legion" and
that "cases finding that the amount of experimentation required by a
given specification was unreasonable in terms of either quantity or
quality are also numerous," with long lists of both.38 The USPTO's
guidelines for patent examiners are no more helpful.39
The level of experimentation needed to go from the Caltech
disclosure of a carbon nanotube resonator to the device disclosed in
Sazonova's Nature paper certainly seems undue: it required over three
years of laboratory work by a group in one of the top carbon nanotube
laboratories in the world-that is, a group with far more than an
ordinary level of skill in the art. But there is no statute or case law
under which this becomes a straightforward conclusion, which is a
problem for a system that is intended to provide efficient incentives and
guide investment decisions.
The second problem illustrated by the carbon nanotube
resonator story is that in practice, patents often are awarded too early.
I am far from the first patent scholar to note this problem. Professor
Chris Cotropia and Professor Sean Seymore have argued that actual
reduction to practice should be required, at least for complex
inventions.40 Professor Martin Adelman has also criticized the
allowance of patents based on "speculative disclosures."41 Professor
Mark Lemley recently argued that "requiring actual reduction to
37. Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quoting ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wands, 858
F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
38. 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03(4)(a)-(b) (2016).
39. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2164 (rev. 9th ed. 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2164.html [https://perma
.cc/SN34-EXUE] [hereinafter MPEP]. The only examiner training materials on enablement focus
on the separate issue of functional claiming. See Examination Guidance and Training Materials,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-
policy/examination-guidance-and-training-materials [https://perma.cc/N28E-TPJT].
40. Cotropia, supra note 5, at 119-28; Seymore, supra note 5, at 641.
41. Martin J. Adelman, Credible Utility in Patent Law, in CHITEKI ZAISANHO NO ATARASHII
NAGARE: KATAYAMA EIji SENSEI KANREKI KINEN RONBUNSHU [NEw TRENDS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CELEBRATORY VOLUME IN HONOR OF PROF. EiJI KATAYAMA] 633 (Seirin Shoin 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245615 [https://perma.cc/66WY-3WEB].
1832 [Vol. 69:6:1825
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practice probably goes too far," but he thinks it is problematic that
patent law currently "reward[s] those who run to the patent office
before they are fully done with the invention and giv[es] them
precedence over those who take the time to make sure their invention
works by building and testing it."42 Perhaps one doctrinal tool to
accomplish this goal of limiting (without completely eliminating)
patents based on constructive reduction to practice is, as John Duffy
suggests, revival of the "paper patent doctrine," which declined in the
late twentieth century.43 But even without formal doctrinal change,
simply enforcing the current enablement requirement would go a long
way toward limiting the problems of prophetic patents.
Why are early patents so problematic? As noted above, this
question of when to award a patent is at root the same problem that
first-year law students struggle with when discussing the famous
dispute over the fox in Pierson v. Post.44 Both foxes and inventions raise
the same basic quandary: If the reward goes only to the hunter who
begins the chase, there is less incentive for someone else who is better
positioned to make the kill. But if the reward goes only to the one who
makes the kill, then others might not begin the chase. If the idea can be
divided in two, it may be possible to give them both some reward, but
that will mean that in some cases the reward is too small to efficiently
incentivize one of them,45 and it will increase the transaction costs of
developing a product that requires rights from both innovators.46 It also
may not legally be possible to reward both inventors; for example, had
42. Lemley, supra note 5, at 1172, 1186-87.
43. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359 (2013).
Alternatively, Professor Dmitry Karshtedt thinks "the enablement requirement of patent law can
become more closely aligned with the norms of the research community" by requiring narrower
claims for certain prophetic patents. Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions:
Process Elements and Biotechnology's Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS
Sci. & TECH. L.J. 109, 114-15 (2011). But I am most concerned about patentees who have not
enabled anything related to their claims and who thus do not seem to deserve a patent at all.
44. Professor Tim Holbrook has discussed this analogy in the context of patent law's written
description requirement. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession
Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2, 15 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and
Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. 987, 997 (2016).
45. Professor Suzanne Scotchmer wrote that for "fully efficient incentives," each innovator
"must earn the entire social surplus of his innovation." Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 34. While this
is not true in general, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 359 n.252 (2013), her broader point still stands: providing sufficient
incentives to both early- and late-stage innovators may be challenging.
46. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) (suggesting that too many
patents on early-stage inventions may hinder later-stage developments due to these transaction
costs). But see Jonathan Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 127, 141
(2015) (arguing that there is little evidence of such anti-commons effects in practice).
18332016]
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Sazonova attempted to file a patent version of her Nature paper, it
likely would have been rejected in light of the Caltech patent, which-
as a granted patent-is presumed to be enabled.
47
In first-year property law classes, Pierson v. Post is generally
used to illustrate the competing policy considerations in deciding when
to award a property right. These considerations include: (1) providing
efficient economic incentives to encourage socially valuable behaviors
(such as killing foxes); (2) providing a reward for those who seem to
deserve it based on the effort expended in the hunt; and (3) increasing
efficiency by providing a clear rule that fox hunters can understand.48
In the patent context, all three of these considerations point toward
awarding patents later that is often done in practice now-once people
are closer to having an invention that actually works.
The tunable nanotube resonator again helps to illustrate this
point. Consider the inventive process as broken into only two steps,
where step one is coming up with a new idea (as represented by the
Caltech patent) and step two is figuring out how to make the idea work
(as represented by Sazonova's Nature paper).49 If coming up with the
initial idea is easy, and making it work is hard, then the reward should
clearly go to the innovator who does the work at step two. If coming up
with the initial idea at step one is hard, and making it work is easy,
then it should not be too onerous to require the idea person to explain
the details of making it work-but even if they are awarded the patent
directly, there is little risk of insufficiently rewarding step two. If both
steps are easy, of course, then no patent is needed at all.
The difficult cases are thus those where both steps are hard. And
to be clear, by "hard" I am not necessarily referring to laborious work-
I am referring to steps that will not get taken but for the inducement of
a patent (or equivalent reward).50 If both the step-one and the step-two
researchers must do significant work that they will not undertake
47. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
see also Seymore, supra note 12 (explaining why this presumption is problematic).
48. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
87-90 (2d ed. 2012); BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. & PAUL GOLDSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP,
USE AND CONSERVATION 208-09 (2d ed. 2014).
49. Note that the trajectory I am focusing on is not the one from basic research to commercial
application; Sazonova's working resonator was still basic research that was far from a commercial
product. Rather, this discussion applies to the trajectory from an idea (which could be basic or
applied) to something that actually works.
50. Cf. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1595 (2011) (arguing that the patentability standard should focus on
identifying "those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patent" (quoting Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966))); Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit
Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 104-05 (2008) (advocating a similar
approach to nonobviousness).
1834 [Vol. 69:6:1825
2016] PIERSON, PEER REVIEW, AND PATENT LAW 1835
without a reward, which should receive the patent on the resulting
completed invention (here, the nanotube resonator)? They both need
some incentive, and they both seem to deserve a reward from a moral
rights perspective.
51
Granting the patent to the step-two innovator has some plain
advantages. Most obviously, the patent system is best tailored as a
reward for steps that are closer to a marketable product, because the
patent system's rewards are tied to the market success of a product.
52
Thus, the patent provides a less uncertain reward with a smaller time
lag for the later innovator. And perhaps just as importantly, rewarding
the person who actually reduces an idea to practice tends to be a clearer
rule than figuring out whether a given description of a nanotube
resonator is actually sufficient before anyone has ever made one.53 This
rule may also map better to the way researchers like Sazonova think
the patent system actually works.
54
But what about the researcher in step one, who by assumption
also has to do some hard work and will not do it without some reward?
In such cases, it is important to remember that the patent system is not
the only mechanism for transferring rewards to innovators. As I have
emphasized in prior work with Professor Daniel Hemel, the United
States already spends over $100 billion per year in direct federal
spending on R&D and over $10 billion more on general R&D-specific
tax incentives.5 5 Policymakers thus have many options for rewarding
early-stage research in cases when the patent system is insufficient.
51. Proponents of commercialization theory would likely argue that the patent should be
awarded even before step one and that having the patent will then provide the incentive to conduct
the research at steps one and two. See generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62
STAN. L. REV. 341, 341 (2010) (proposing "a new 'commercialization' patent, granted in exchange
for the commitment to make and sell a substantially novel product"). Those concerned with the
inefficiencies of patent racing might also prefer for patents to be awarded as early as possible. See
generally Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV.
803 (2007) (reviewing the racing literature). I am assuming here, however, that the primary role
of a patent is to provide an incentive for innovation. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 45, at 359-
61 (examining the relationship between these different theories).
52. See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 45, at 327 (describing how the patent reward
is "market set").
53. Cf. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), finding for the man who killed the
fox "for the sake of certainty":
If the first seeing, starting, or pursuing such animals, without having so wounded,
circumvented or ensnared them, so as to deprive them of their natural liberty, and
subject them to the control of their pursuer, should afford the basis of actions against
others for intercepting and killing them, it would prove a fertile source of quarrels and
litigation.
54. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 45, at 321-25.
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In sum, patenting practices often seem divorced from the
standards for judging technical contributions in many fields, with many
patents looking more like research proposals than completed scientific
papers. The fundamental problem seems to be the information
asymmetry at the USPTO: patent examiners do not have the expertise
necessary to spot problems with patent disclosures. Part II explores this
concern.
II. THE NEED FOR EXPERT REVIEW OF PATENT DISCLOSURES, AND WHY
PRIOR-ART-FOCUSED PEER REVIEW CHANNELS ARE INSUFFICIENT
As discussed in Part I, speculative patents such as the Caltech
nanotube resonator patent seem both problematic from a policy
perspective and dubious from a legal perspective. This leads to a third
general problem with patent disclosures: patent examiners often do not
have the scientific expertise necessary to spot these kinds of disclosure
problems. And while patents are supposed to enable researchers of
ordinary skill in the art to recreate the invention without undue
experimentation, it typically takes extraordinary skill in the art to spot
enablement problems based merely on reading a patent document.
As one of the leading experts on nanotube resonators who had
struggled with making one actually work, Sazonova could quickly point
to the gaps in the disclosure of the Caltech patent. These problems were
not obvious to me, even though I earned a Ph.D. for related
experimental work with carbon nanotubes and would thus almost
certainly represent he perspective of a person of at least ordinary skill
in the art. Unless one has extraordinary skill in the art, it is far easier
to figure out whether the claim elements are present in prior art
references than to figure out whether undue experimentation is still
required. And as noted above, most examiners lack extraordinary skill:
fewer than four percent of patent examiners even have a Ph.D., and
most leave the USPTO before acquiring even four years of examination
experience.56
For readers without laboratory experience, a hypothetical from
the kitchen might help. Suppose you are given a recipe for a cronut-
the famed croissant/donut hybrid that continues to create multi-hour
lines at Dominique Ansel's NYC bakery, which has sparked numerous
copycats and debates over IP in recipes.57 (Ansel's website emphasizes
56. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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its registered trademark, "Cronut®,"58 though there is a good argument
that the term is generic.59) Ansel has in fact published an "at home"
cronut recipe,60 which takes three days but contains no great surprises
for experienced chefs.61 Ansel's recipe likely enables someone of
ordinary pastry skills to create a cronut, provided they have sufficient
patience (and butter). But suppose the recipe you are given omits the
directions to refrigerate the dough between rolling and folding it to
create another butter layer. If you are a chef of ordinary skill-one who
has never gone through the effort of making homemade croissants or
puff pastry dough-the problem would not be revealed unless you
actually try to reproduce the invention. But if you are a pastry chef of
extraordinary skill, even if you have never made a cronut, it would be
immediately apparent that the recipe would fail: allowing the butter to
soften will cause it to run into the dough rather than producing flaky
croissant layers, and without refrigeration the dough will be too elastic
to roll.6
2
In sum, it typically takes more expertise to understand, simply
by reading a recipe, whether the recipe will work than to follow a recipe
in the first place. Thus, even if a patent examiner is a person of ordinary
skill for some of the patents they examine, they will still lack the
extraordinary skill needed to know whether the person of ordinary skill
would be able to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation.
It is difficult to determine how pervasive the problem of
inadequate disclosures is, but there is no reason to believe that the
Caltech patent is a unique example.63 When I surveyed nanotechnology
58. Cronut® 101, DOMINIQUE ANSEL BAKERY, http://dominiqueansel.com/cronut-101
[https://perma.cc/TP2F-U7DU].
59. Cf. Chris Morran, Bakery that Never Used the Word "Cronut" Told To Stop Using the
Word "Cronut," CONSUMERIST (Oct. 24, 2014), https://consumerist.com/2014/10/24/bakery-that-
never-used-the-word-cronut-told-to-stop -using-the-word-cronut [https://perma.cc/JK4J-US6Q]
(quoting a bakery owner who received a cease-and-desist letter from Donique Ansel as saying that
"everybody refers to them as cronuts and we can't be responsible for what customers choose to call
it").
60. Dominique Ansel's At-Home Cronut: The Pastry That Changed the World, ABC NEWS
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/recipe/home-cronut-recipe-dominique-ansel-25948902
[https://perma.cc/8Q4N-GG7E].
61. See Katy Salter, Revealed: The Official Cronut Recipe (and Why You Will Never Make
One), GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2014/oct/07/
official-cronut-recipe-dominique-ansel-three-days [https://perma.cc/EK63-B6L9] ("[T]he most
surprising thing about Ansel's 'secret' recipe is that it contains no great secrets.").
62. See JACQUES PEPIN, JACQUES PEPIN'S COMPLETE TECHNIQUES 570,711 (2001) (discussing
the effects of heat and humidity on puff pastry).
63. Janet Freilich is working on an empirical study to algorithmically quantify prophetic




researchers about their experience reading patents, only thirty-eight
percent of patent-reading respondents thought the patents they read
were reproducible.6 4 For example, an industrial chemist thought that
"it was not clear if the inventors ever actually made the invention and
saw that it worked as claimed," and an academic studying
nanomechanics complained about "lazy people [who] sit in their office
and say 'we should do this'" and then patent it without "complet[ing]
these projects."65 In a more recent survey of researchers across a
broader range of sectors and fields, when I asked patent readers if they
thought they could recreate the most recent patent they had read in
their field, forty-one percent said definitely or probably yes, thirty-four
percent said maybe, and twenty-five percent said definitely or probably
not.66 The more skeptical readers had complaints about patents on "just
ideas [that were] not experimentally proven," a "level of detail, or lack
thereof, [that] would not be acceptable in any reputable peer-reviewed
publication in the same field," or even a patent that "was claiming
something was possible that is not technically possible."67
It is possible that patent disclosures could be improved from a
social welfare perspective by finding ways to bring these expert voices-
those who do have extraordinary skill in the art-into the patent
examination process. One promising way to do this is through some
form of external peer review.68 Patent scholars such as Professor Jeanne
Fromer and I have previously advocated for peer review by outside
experts during patent examination.69 These proposals are modeled on
the ubiquitous use of expert peer review for evaluation of scientific
journal articles and applications for grants from federal science
64. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 576.
65. Id. at 578.
66. The survey methodology is described in detail in a separate manuscript, which will be
published along with the full dataset. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents? (Sept. 8,
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
67. For additional comments, see id.
68. Alternatively, one could try to increase expertise within the USPTO, such as by
increasing salaries and training to attract and retain top scientific talent. Such a dramatic
restructuring of personnel management seems less feasible, however, than the more mild
intervention proposed here. See generally Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of
Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at section VII.C), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2785927 [https://perma.cc/3YVC-C9RF] (reviewing these more conventional
internal means of improving quality within the administrative state and suggesting that "while it
may not be the most direct way to promote accurate decision making, peer review might, as a
political economy matter, be the most feasible").
69. Fromer, supra note 9, at 591-92; Ouellette, supra note 1, at 591-92; see also Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 108-09 (2015) [hereinafter
Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism] (proposing peer review of examiners by each other, which is
different from peer review focused on gathering outside knowledge).
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agencies,70 and a number of scholars have suggested that broader use
of peer review could have benefits throughout the administrative
state.
71
But this does not mean that there have been no opportunities for
third-party experts to provide input on pending patent applications.
The USPTO has experimented with a version of crowdsourced prior art
gathering through the Peer To Patent pilot program orchestrated by
Professor Beth Noveck,72 and third parties may also submit relevant
prior art through the preissuance submissions procedure.7 3 This Part
briefly reviews these programs and explains why they are insufficient
for improving patent disclosures.
The Peer To Patent pilot was an opt-in program in which patent
applicants could volunteer to have their applications listed on the Peer
To Patent website for crowdsourcing of the most relevant..prior art
references, up to ten of which would be forwarded to the examiner for
review.74 The initial pilot program, which ran from July 2007 to June
2009, attracted 226 applications and an average of 2.66 prior art
references per application.75 For thirty-eight of the 226 applications,
examiners cited prior art identified through Peer To Patent as a basis
for rejection in some office action.76 A second pilot began in October 2010
and accepted applications until September 2011,77 but no results have
been reported from this period.
The first Peer To Patent pilot did not hit its limit of four hundred
participating applications, raising questions about the viability of an
70. For an overview of the peer review processes at Nature magazine, the National Science
Foundation, and the National Institutes of Health, see Getting Published in Nature: The Editorial
Process, NATURE, http://www.nature.com/nature/authors/get-published [https://perma.cc/2UWH-
CFE8]; Merit Review, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/merit-review
[https://perma.cc/9M6Q-3N95]; and Peer Review Process, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, http://grants.nih
.gov/grants/peer-review-process.htm [https://perma.cc/KD4J-S3MT].
71. See generally Ho, supra note 68 (reviewing the peer review literature and studying the
feasibility of peer review among food safety inspectors).
72. See NAOMI ALLEN ET AL., PEER TO PATENT: FIRST PILOT FINAL RESULTS (2012),
http://www.peertopatent.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/1 1/First-Pilot-Final-Results.pdf
[https://perma.ccN4N6-6BYP]; Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent"' Collective Intelligence, Open
Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 143-51 (2006).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (2012).
74. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 72, at 4-5.
75. Id. at 2, 26.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Letter from Mark H. Webbink, Visiting Professor and Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Patent
Innovations at N.Y. Law Sch., to Hiram Bernstein, Senior Legal Advisor, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 14 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/comments/x_aia-
c-nylawschool-ctr_webbink_20110916.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FRV-EMAM].
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opt-in open-peer-review model.78 (Interestingly, a 2006 trial with open
peer review by Nature magazine was also less popular than initial
enthusiasm suggested.79) More significantly, the design of the pilots
makes it very difficult to draw conclusions about their causal effect. The
final report from the first pilot program was focused on only describing
the extent to which the program was used and surveying examiners
about the program.8 0 As I have previously observed, the USPTO's
willingness to experiment with pilot programs is laudable, but it would
learn far more from these pilots by testing them on a randomized basis,
such as by randomizing over the applicants who wanted to opt in to the
program.
81
The Peer To Patent pilot is no longer accepting applications, and
it is unclear whether it will be renewed.8 2 But there is another way for
outside experts to contribute to patent examination: the third-party
preissuance submissions process of 37 C.F.R. § 1.290 that became
effective on September 16, 2012.83 Under this provision, after an
application is published (typically eighteen months after filing), any
third party has six months to submit relevant prior art along with "a
concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted
78. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 72, at 34 (noting the number of participating applications
in the Peer To Patent pilot).
79. Overview: Nature's Peer Review Trial, NATURE (Dec. 2006), http://www.nature.com/
nature/peerreview/debate/nature05535.html [https://perma.cc/3VGV-UE2U].
80. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 72. As far as I am aware, the only attempt at a more
rigorous evaluation is Jin-Hyuk Kim & Benjamin Mitra-Kahn, Peer Reviewed Patent Applications:
Evidence from a Pilot Program (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (https://kelley.iu.edu/BEPP/
documents/kim paperPeerReviewed.pdf) [https:/perma.cc/555X-YPJQ]. But they make choices
such as that "the number of community reviewers registered on the Peer To Patent website for
each application in the treatment group can be used as a plausible instrument." Id. at 20. This
means they are assuming that the number of reviewers for each application is not correlated with
their outcome measures-the probability of allowance and the number of forward citations-which
seems dubious. They conclude that the probability of allowance is lowered by five percent for every
piece of contributed prior art but that the second-order effect of examiners allowing more
applications that enter the treatment group in the first place works in the opposite direction and
typically outweighs this effect. See id. at 22.
81. Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, supra note 69, at 98; see also Michael Abramowicz,
Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011) (discussing
randomization as a tool to estimate the efficacy of laws and regulations).
82. The most recent information on the Peer To Patent website is a report from 2012. See
Peer To Patent, N.Y. LAW SCH., http://www.peertopatent.org [https://perma.cc/2XA8-6GSM].
83. See generally Third-Party Preissuance Submissions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/third-party-preissuance-submissions [https://perma.cc/
H6Q5-AJ23] (providing an overview of the mechanism and a link for filing submissions).
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document."8 4 Arguments against patentability are not allowed.8 5 This
provision has attracted few submissions8 6 and even less scholarly
attention.8 7 It is thus not yet clear how much effect the third-party
preissuance submissions process will have in practice.
There are of course many ways that third parties could be
incentivized to participate in programs like Peer To Patent and the
preissuance submissions process, including monetary rewards or faster
patent processing times for parties who locate art that the examiner
relies on. But even if these programs were more widely used (or
implemented in a manner more susceptible to rigorous evaluation),
neither could be an effective means for improving patent disclosures
due to the same basic flaw: both mechanisms have focused only on
identifying relevant prior art. Unless an expert can identify a prior art
reference stating that a claimed invention is impossible, these
mechanisms could not be used to explain why an application's
disclosure is inadequate. The sole opportunity for third parties to make
arguments related to patentability is currently the "protest" procedure
of 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 that may be used only before an application is
published (unless the applicant consents to post-publication
submissions),88 and that is thus of little practical use for those without
some external reason to know of the patent.
The USPTO "considers inappropriate any third-party inquiry, or
submission in an application that is not provided for in" the third-party
preissuance submissions provision or the prepublication protest
84. 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (2012). Submissions are not allowed after a notice of allowance is
mailed for the application, and third parties may have more than six months if a first rejection has
not yet been mailed. Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.290(b)(2) (2016).
85. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150 (July 17, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 1, 41).
86. From September 16, 2012 to October 25, 2013, the USPTO received 1204 submissions, of
which only 870 were deemed compliant with the necessary procedures. See SARAH KAPELNER ET
AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF PRE-ISSUANCE SUBMISSIONS ON THE PATENT EXAMINATION
PROCESS 23 (2013), https://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-122013-161237/
unrestricted/FINALPAPER pdf version.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2YS-JYT7]. As of March 27, 2015,
the USPTO received 2580 submissions. A1A Statistics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www
.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act- aia/aia-statistics [https://perma.cc/
EJG5-EDTZ]. In comparison, the USPTO has received over 500,000 utility patent applications
each year since 2011. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2015, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm [https://perma.cc/
U5JY-PWQE].
87. One of the only pieces on the new provision is a student note that contends that the
provision should be expanded to allow argumentation. Alexander R. Trzeciak, Note, Taboo, the
Game: Patent Office Edition-The New Preissuance Submissions Under the America Invents Act,
63 DUKE L.J. 245 (2013).
88. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (2012).
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procedure.8 9 Thus, not only is there no formal effort to reach out to
third-party experts who may have valuable insight regarding the
adequacy of patent disclosures, there is also no opportunity for
interested experts to voluntarily contribute to examination.
III. BRINGING THE PERSON OF EXTRAORDINARY SKILL
INTO THE PATENT EXAMINATION PROCESS
The previous two Parts have explained that patents are often
granted too early, because patent examiners lack the expertise needed
to recognize that the patent disclosure is not yet sufficient to enable
those of ordinary skill to create the invention and that those who have
this expertise have no opportunity to share their knowledge with the
USPTO. In this Part, I argue it is worth experimenting with a robust
peer review system to solicit input from those of extraordinary skill in
the field of an application.
Such a system could of course be mandated by statute, but it
would also be possible to use a similar legal mechanism as that
implemented by the Peer To Patent pilot: applicants could opt in to the
peer review system and thereby consent to a limited waiver of the bar
on post-publication protests under 37 C.F.R. § 1.291.90 (A mandatory
version would of course be preferable from a policy perspective, given
that applicants would be unlikely to opt in with their most important
patents.) Under either version, given the uncertainty about the causal
effect of peer review, it would be important to initially test the program
in a rigorous way, such as by randomly choosing some applications that
could not be sent out for review to serve as a control group.91
There are many possible design choices: Examiners could send
every application in the treatment group out for review or only those for
which they think outside expertise would be valuable. (It may even be
possible to design a market mechanism in which competitors can flag
applications that seem most in need of expert review.) Examiners could
ask very specific questions or simply give the experts an open-ended
opportunity for their thoughts on the application. Experts could be sent
individual applications within their field of expertise (as for review of
most journal articles) or they could be recruited to serve on review
89. MPEP, supra note 39, § 1134.
90. For the Peer To Patent framework, see John J. Doll, Pilot Concerning Public Submission
of Peer Reviewed Prior Art, 1319 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE 146 (June 26, 2007),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2007/week26/patsuba.htm [https://perma.cc/K6S4-
X2X7].
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting the problems with evaluating Peer To
Patent given that it was not implemented with any degree of randomization).
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panels (as for review of most federal grant applications). Applications
could be sent to varying numbers of experts. The most plausible design
options could be tested as part of the policy experiment.
92
Likely objections to such an experiment are that (1) there are
not sufficient experts willing to review patents to cover the massive
influx of applications the USPTO receives; (2) the few experts who
would agree to review would be biased competitors of the applicant; and
(3) the reviews would have little effect on examination such that they
would not be worth the cost. The remainder of this Part considers these
objections in turn.
First, would sufficient numbers of experts be motivated to
contribute their efforts to a patent peer review system to cover demand
from the USPTO? As an initial note, if recruiting experts is a problem,
then the response should not be to abandon the idea altogether-it
should be to limit the requests for review to those applications for which
examiners think outside input would be most valuable. But I am
optimistic about the viability of a large-scale program.
As I have noted previously, the feasibility of patent peer review
would not be limited by the number of scientists willing to provide peer
reviews in general; the number of patents issued per year is
significantly smaller than the number of peer-reviewed scientific
journal articles.93 Scientists are accustomed to reviewing these journal
articles for free as part of their service to the scientific community, and
it is not implausible that they would also willingly review patents if
they viewed the patent system as benefiting scientists as well as
lawyers. Given the commercial nature of the patent system and the high
fees paid by patent applicants, it should be feasible to pay reviewers an
honorarium for their participation.
94
To obtain some measure of scientists' willingness to participate
in such a program, for my recent survey on when researchers read
patents, I also asked respondents about patent peer review: "Some have
suggested that patent examination should occasionally rely on peer
92. A more radical (but insightful) proposal for attracting outside expertise is to turn the
patenting decision completely over to third-party private entities. See Michael Abramowicz & John
F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541 (2009).
93. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 592 ("For the past ten years, the USPTO has typically issued
roughly 150,000 utility patents per year. The ISI Science Citation Index, which covers 6650 major
peer-reviewed scientific journals, averages nearly one million new articles per year. In 2009, the
USPTO issued 2675 patents with 'nano' in one of their claims, while the Science Citation Index
contains 67,294 articles from 2009 with 'nano' in the topic field." (footnotes omitted)).
94. If the cost of filing a patent increases slightly, that might have the independent benefit
of screening out more low-value patents. See Jonathan Masur, Costly Screens and Patent




reviews from researchers in the field of the invention. Would you be
willing to occasionally review patents for the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office to help improve the patent literature?"95 Out of 813 respondents,
thirty-three percent said they would occasionally review patents for
free, and another thirty-eight percent said they would occasionally
review patents if they were paid at least a certain amount.96 The
median requested payment was $300 for those who named a flat rate
and $250/hour for those who named an hourly fee.97 These were not all
academics: out of 201 industry respondents, thirty-six percent said they
would review for free, and thirty-five percent said they would review for
a fee.98 And to be clear, there is no reason that those asked to review
patents should be only the primarily academic scientists who already
peer review for scientific journals; all users of the patent system,
including private-sector applicants who do not publish their results in
scientific journals, should be incentivized to participate.
Of course, these numbers are likely biased upward: the people
who are willing to respond to a survey for free are also more likely to be
the ones who would do peer review for free (or for a small honorarium).
But these results are at least suggestive that a non-negligible number
of researchers might be willing to participate in such a program.
A second potential concern with a patent peer review program is
that the results would be biased.99 I have previously argued that this
concern would be mitigated by making clear that patent examiners-
like editors at top peer-reviewed science journals-are not bound by
reviewers' opinions on the ultimate merits of the application.100 If a
reviewer has a competitive relationship with an applicant, then this
may increase his or her motivation to scrutinize the application for
patentability problems, but all that ultimately matters is whether the
reviewer provides information that is relevant to the examiner.101
Sometimes the most helpful reviewers are the most critical ones, as long
95. Ouellette, supra note 66.
96. Id.
97. The twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles were $100 and $500 for those who named
a flat rate and $100/hour and $500/hour for those who named an hourly fee. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Fromer, supra note 9, at 592 n.245:
A problem with (closed or open) peer review of disclosure is that feedback might be
misleading or wrong: first, competitors have self-interest to deter issuance of patents to
their rivals, maximize disclosure, impose greater communication costs on their rivals,
and learn more about their rivals' works; second, allowing anyone to contribute
feedback increases the chance that reviewers provide irrelevant feedback.
100. Ouellette, supra note 1, at 592.
101. Cf. Noveck, supra note 72, at 156 ("If people produce information that is useful to the
examiner, their personal agendas are irrelevant.").
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as the decisionmaker (here, the examiner) is a neutral third party.
Indeed, if a direct competitor is unable to identify any clear validity
problem with an application, then that might be evidence that the
application should be granted.
To be sure, examiners can only fulfill this role if they have
enough expertise to understand the reviews from experts, even if they
would not have spotted all of these problems themselves. It may be that
peer review will only really be successful if it is a complement, not a
substitute, to improving in-house expertise. But the USPTO cannot
reject patents simply based on conclusory statements that inventions
are trivial or even based on their own "assessment of what would be
basic knowledge or common sense"; rather, examiners "must point to
concrete evidence in the record to support these findings."10 2 And
applicants have many opportunities to rebut biased arguments: the.
USPTO can never issue a truly final rejection.
103
In any case, if bias turns out to be a problem, it would be
straightforward to require reviewers to disclose conflicts of interest, as
is already done at journals and grant agencies using scientific peer
review such as Nature,04  Science,05  the National Science
Foundation,106 and the National Institutes of Health.0 7 If disclosed
102. In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For example, the USPTO rejected the
following claim to a rowing machine as obvious in light of a prior art chest press machine that
could perform the same function:
A row exercise machine comprising an input assembly including a first handle portion
adapted to be moved from a first position to a second position by a pulling force exerted
by a user on the first handle portion in a rowing motion, the input assembly defining a
substantially linear path for the first handle portion from the first position to the second
position.
In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding
that the USPTO had not carried its burden of showing a prima facie case of obviousness, because
chest press machines are not designed to be pulled rather than pushed and thus do not meet the
"adapted to" limitation of this claim. Id. at 1379-81.
103. See Sean Tu, Understanding the Backlog Problems Associated with Requests for
Continued Examination Practice, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 216, 219-20 (2015) (listing the
numerous options for patent applicants who receive a "final" rejection).
104. Getting Published in Nature, supra note 70 ("Nature requires potential referees to
disclose any professional and commercial competing interests before undertaking to review a
paper ... ").
105. Peer Review at Science Publications, SCIENCE, http://www.sciencemag.org/authors/peer-
review-science-publications [https://perma.cc/A624-3XN3] (requiring disclosure of "any
professional or financial affiliations that may be perceived as a conflict of interest in reviewing the
manuscript, or a history of personal differences with the author(s)").
106. Appendix B-Potentially Disqualifying Conflicts of Interest, NAT'L SCI. FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gpg/nsf04 23/appb.jsp [https://perma.cc/N2FQ-JPJS].
107. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES: INFORMATION FOR
REVIEWERS OF NIH APPLICATIONS AND R&D CONTRACT PROPOSALS (2015), http://grants.nih.gov/
grants/peer/NIHConflict.of_InterestRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU6K-XAH5].
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conflicts of interest are found to be disqualifying, this would exacerbate
any problem with finding sufficient reviewers, but there would still
likely be many academics and other experts in any given field who do
not have a commercial interest in the technology.
A final possible objection is that patent peer reviews may have
little effect on examination-or at least that their effect may not be
worth the cost of administering such a program, including the
significant costs for the outside experts.108 As Professor Mark Lemley
has observed, given how few patents are litigated or even licensed,
spending more resources on examination is not always rational.109 And
it would certainly be irrational to invest considerable resources in a
peer review program if examiners end up ignoring the experts' reports.
Professors Chris Cotropia, Mark Lemley, and Bhaven Sampat have
found "that patent examiners rarely use applicant-submitted art in
their rejections to narrow patents, relying almost exclusively on prior
art they find themselves."' 10 Examiners are typically allotted only
around twenty total hours per application,1 and if they think their
limited time is most efficiently spent on their own search processes,
they might pay little attention to outside peer reviews.
One reason to be more optimistic in this context is that
preliminary survey evidence of patent examiners suggests that they
generally have found third-party preissuance submissions to be
helpful.11 2 This does not necessarily mean, however, that the
submissions had an impact on examination decisions or that their
benefit was worth the submitters' time. It is possible that a larger effect
might be observed by simply allowing the examiners to spend the
additional time that the experts would be spending on peer review.
108. For a discussion of the challenges in conducting a cost-benefit analysis of a patent policy
change, see Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1701, 1701-03 (2016).
109. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
Professor Beth Noveck puzzlingly states that having costs "borne by a 'third party' to the
[examination] proceedings" somehow "sidesteps this problem," Noveck, supra note 72, at 158, but
there is no reason that costs to third parties should not be included in the welfare analysis of the
program.
110. Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent
Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL'Y 844, 844 (2013).
111. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO's Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67,
72 n.16 (2013).
112. See KAPELNER ETAL., supra note 86, at xiii:
For the examiners who had reviewed a submission thus far, general attitudes were
positive about the Program, with the submission frequently helping the examiner save
time during the application review process. The submission was helpful in narrowing
the scope of the prior art search for the examiner, and the concise description of
relevance often helped the examiner read through the references more quickly when
the claims were mapped out.
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If this turns out to be a problem, it would be an additional
argument in favor of limiting peer review requests to those applications
for which examiners affirmatively request outside input. Or perhaps
peer review should only be used for patents undergoing post-grant
review, for which there is an external signal that the patent is worth
extra scrutiny. But this currently speculative concern about costs is not
a reason not to try peer review of patent disclosures; rather, it is one of
the issues that should be monitored when experimenting with such a
program. I have previously advocated greater use of policy
experimentation in the USPTO,113 and a peer review system that
facilitates input on patent disclosures seems ripe for such an
experimental test.
At the very least, even if patent examiners do not affirmatively
reach out to experts who may be able to provide useful information, it
seems worth lifting the ban on voluntary submissions of information,
related to the adequacy of patent application disclosures.114 Nothing
about the patent examination process necessitates uch a limitation on
information flow, and the European Patent Office is ahead of the
USPTO in this regard: Article 115 of the European Patent Convention
allows "any third party" to "present observations concerning the
patentability of the invention to which the application or patent
relates."115 Their examination guidelines make clear that such
observations "may ... be directed to ... sufficiency of disclosure."
' 16 It
is time for the United States to catch up.
CONCLUSION
Over two hundred years after it was decided, Pierson v. Post
continues to introduce first-year law students to the basic tradeoffs in
determining when a new property right should be rewarded.117 I have
argued that when one considers these tradeoffs in the patent context, it
seems that patents are often awarded too early and also that it is too
unclear when these early patents will be allowed. The fundamental
113. Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, supra note 69.
114. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
115. Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 115, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199
(as amended Nov. 29, 2000), http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/arll5
.html [https://perma.cc/8RN7-FZMK].
116. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, Part E, Ch. V, § 3 (Nov. 2015 ed.), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/guidelines
.html [https://perma.cc/ D2WY-SGAJ ] (download "Part E").
117. And perhaps also "to horrify" them "with the thought that success in law school means
understanding debates among nineteenth century judges regarding the relevance of sixth century
treatises about the ownership of a dead fox." Berger, supra note 2, at 1091.
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problem is that even though a patent disclosure need only enable a
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention, it often
takes extraordinary skill to spot a disclosure problem based merely on
reading the patent application. A promising possibility for overcoming
this information asymmetry is to introduce a peer review program that
allows patent examiners to seek input from scientists with greater
expertise. Justice Livingston's dissent in Pierson v. Post argued that the
"knotty point" of ownership of the fox "should have been submitted to
the arbitration of sportsmen"; perhaps bringing scientists into the
patent examination process will clarify and improve the rules for
ownership of ideas.
